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Abstract 
This paper points out the merit of Nagelian reduction, namely to propose a model of inter-
theoretic reduction that retains the scientific quality of the reduced theory, and the merit of 
functional reduction, namely to take multiple realization into account and to offer reductive 
explanations. By considering Lewis’ and Kim’s proposal for local reductions, we establish that 
functional reduction fails to achieve a theory reduction and cannot retain the scientific quality of 
the reduced theory. We improve on that proposal by showing how one can build functional sub-
types that are coextensive with physical realizer types and thereby obtain a theory reduction that 
is explanatory and that vindicates the scientific quality of the special sciences. 
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1. The motivation for Nagelian reduction 
Consider a theory T1 of a special science with a limited domain of application such as, for 
instance, classical genetics or folk psychology. Assume that T1 is true or approximately true, 
that its concepts seize natural kinds, that it contains laws or law-like generalizations, which 
capture salient causal connections in the world, that it has ample predictive success, etc. – in 
short, let T1 be a mature scientific theory. We wonder how T1 fits into our broader body of 
knowledge. We have no inclination to suppose that T1 is about properties – and connections 
between properties – that do not strongly supervene on more basic physical properties. Let us 
therefore assume that there is a more basic theory T2 with a broader domain of application that 
includes the domain of objects to which T1 refers, such as, for instance, a theory of molecular 
biology or physics. Since the domain of objects of T1 is a proper part of the domain of objects 
of T2 and since the properties with which T1 is concerned strongly supervene on the properties 
with which T2 is concerned, there has to be a systematic relationship between T1 and T2, 
including a systematic relationship between the laws of T1 and the laws of T2 (given that the 
manner in which the properties in the focus of T1 are connected with each other, as captured 
by the laws of T1, strongly supervenes on the manner in which the properties in the focus of T2 
are connected with each other, as captured by the laws of T2). 
The reducibility of T1 to T2 is the primary candidate for such a systematic relationship. If 
the properties in the domain of T1 strongly supervene on the properties in the domain of T2, 
then all the truths about the properties in the domain of T1 are derivable from the truths about 
the properties in the domain of T2. This is not to say that they are a priori derivable; the 
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deduction may need principles that are established only a posteriori. In the following, we 
briefly recall the Nagelian model of deriving the laws of T1 from the laws of T2 and thus the 
reduction of T1 to T2 (this section). We then point out how the Nagelian account of theory 
reduction fails due to multiple realization and how Lewis’ and Kim’s model of functional 
reduction takes multiple realization into account. However, that model falls short of a theory 
reduction; it ends up in the elimination of T1 rather than its reduction to T2 (section 2). Against 
this background, the rationale of this paper is to show a way to develop functional reduction 
into a model of a fully-fledged, conservative theory reduction, thereby marrying the merits of 
Nagelian reduction and functional reduction (section 3). 
In order to be in the position to derive the laws of T1 from the laws of T2, it is necessary to 
have concepts proper to T2 and figuring in the laws of T2 at one’s disposal that cover the 
extension of the concepts proper to T1 and figuring in the laws of T1. The issue is only about 
extension: the meaning (intension) of the concepts of T1 can remain unrelated to the meaning 
(intension) of the concepts of T2. For instance, one can master the concepts “gene”, 
“phenotypic effects”, “heredity”, etc. and make reliable predictions in terms of these concepts 
without understanding the meaning of the concepts “DNA”, “protein synthesis”, “DNA 
polymerase”, etc. and thus without having any idea about molecular biology. But if one 
wishes to derive what classical genetics tells us about genes from molecular biology (or 
physics), then one needs a proper molecular concept figuring in laws of molecular biology 
that covers the extension of the concept “gene”, the concept of “DNA” being a suitable 
candidate for such a concept for the purposes of this paper. 
Covering the extension does not necessarily imply coextension, since the domain of 
application of T2 – and thus the domain of application of its laws – is usually broader than the 
domain of application of T1. But, leaving aside the issue of multiple realization, this is not a 
problem: it is logically possible to build within T2 concepts in the vocabulary proper to T2 that 
are tailor-made for the domain of application of the concepts proper to T1 and formulate the 
laws of T2 in terms of these tailor-made concepts, insofar as these laws are relevant to the 
proper part of the domain of application of T2 that is identical with the domain of application 
of T1. Assume that the concept “gene” covers only that part of the extension of the concept 
“DNA” of molecular biology in which DNA sequences are replicated and cause observable 
effects like the colour of blossoms. It is then possible to build concepts of molecular genetics 
(T2) that focus only on such effects of DNA sequences. On that basis, one may furthermore 
formulate laws in which these more restricted concepts figure (insofar as these laws apply 
only to particular effects of DNA sequences). The important point is that for each concept 
proper to T1, one needs one concept proper to T2 and suitable to figure in the laws of T2 that 
covers the extension of the concept proper to T1 in question. 
We thus get to the two conditions both necessary and together sufficient that the textbook 
accounts of Nagelian reduction, going back to Nagel (1961, chapter 11) pose: in order to 
reduce T1 to T2, one has (a) to build for each concept F proper to T1 and figuring in the laws of 
T1 a concept P in T2 suitable to figure in the laws of T2 that is coextensive with F so that the 
following biconditional holds: 
 
(1) ∀x (Fx ⇔ Px) 
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Furthermore, (b) one has to deduce the laws of T1 from the laws of T2 by means of such 
biconditionals. These bridge principles in the form of biconditionals are not themselves laws 
of nature, since they relate only the concepts of different theories, without necessarily telling 
us anything new about nature (see also Kim 2008, section II). But they have to be 
nomologically necessary in the following sense: in any possible world in which the laws of T1 
and the laws of T2 hold, these biconditionals are also valid. 
In Nagelian reduction, there is no question of T1 being eliminated as a result of its reduction 
to T2. If the no miracles argument is a good argument for scientific realism, that argument 
applies not only to the more fundamental theory T2, but also to the special science theory T1, 
since T1 (e.g. classical genetics, or folk psychology) includes a wide range of successful 
predictions. The central merit of Nagelian reduction is that it is a model of theory reduction 
that permits to retain both T1 and T2 as part of our system of scientific knowledge. 
2. The motivation for functional reduction and its limits 
Multiple realization is the main objection against Nagelian reduction and inter-theoretic 
reduction in general. Even if the properties in the domain of T1 strongly supervene on the 
properties in the domain of T2, this does not imply that we can achieve biconditional links 
between the concepts proper to T1 and concepts belonging to T2. Strong supervenience is 
compatible with multiple realization. The properties in the domain of T1 can be multiply 
realized by property configurations of different types in the domain of T2. Consequently, one 
cannot infer from the properties that are given in a certain situation, coming under T1, which 
(subvenient) property configurations there are, coming under T2. Therefore, multiple 
realization implies the failure of Nagelian reduction as it stands. 
However, there is a form of reduction compatible with multiple realization, namely 
functional reduction as proposed notably by Lewis (1972, 1980 and 1994) and taken up and 
further developed by Kim (1998 and 2005). Functional reduction proceeds in three steps: 
1) One defines the property types in the domain of T1 in a functional manner by indicating 
notably their characteristic effects in terms of T1 – to put it differently, the causal roles that 
tokens of these property types exercise. 
2) One looks for realizers of these causal roles in the domain of the properties of T2. The 
realizers of the functionally defined properties may differ physically. 
3) One explains in each case – that is, for each token (and thus independently of whether or 
not multiple realization obtains) – why there is a functional property falling in the domain of 
T1 by describing how a configuration of properties in the domain of T2 present in the situation 
under consideration brings about the effects that are characteristic of the functional property 
type in the domain of T1 in question. 
For instance, classical genetics defines genes in a functional way. Genes encode genetic 
information for the production of phenotypic effects that can be transmitted from generation 
to generation (1). The specific causal roles of genes are realized by molecular configurations, 
namely certain DNA sequences, though often molecularly different ones, in most known 
organisms (2). Molecular biology can explain how such configurations – notably certain DNA 
sequences – are copied and transmitted to the next generation and how they bring about the 
effects that are pointed out in the functional definitions of classical genetics (3). 
Functional reduction hence offers in each case, even if there is multiple realization, a causal 
explanation of why there is a property token present falling in the domain of T1 by telling us 
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how the effects that are characteristic of the property type in question are brought about (cf. 
what Chalmers 1996, pp. 42-51, calls a reductive explanation). Functional reduction thereby 
explains why there are properties falling in the domain of T1 in the world and thus shows how 
T1 is about salient properties. More precisely, the explanation in question is a mechanistic one 
in the sense of Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000), revealing a mechanism that brings 
about the effects characteristic of a certain property type in the domain of T1 (see also Kim 
2008). 
In order to provide such reductive explanations, functional reduction has to rely on some 
sort of bridge principles in its step 2 as well (see Endicott 1998, section 8, Hüttemann 2004, 
chapter 4.3, Marras 2005, pp. 344-347, Fazekas 2009; but see also Morris 2009 against this 
claim). The reason is that the definition of the property types in the domain of T1 (step 1) 
including the description of their characteristic effects is carried out in the concepts proper to 
T1. By contrast, all the properties in the domain of T2 and their effects are described in the 
concepts proper to T2. Hence, in order to be in the position to discern in step 2 a certain 
configuration of properties in the domain of T2 as a realizer of a property type in the domain 
of T1, one has to create a link between concepts proper to T2 and concepts proper to T1. This 
link is generally established on the basis of identifying the effects brought about by a certain 
property in the domain of T1 in a given situation with effects brought about by a configuration 
of a certain type in the domain of T2 in that situation. 
To put it differently, the identification of realizer types does not presuppose biconditional 
bridge principles but is based on the common effects of properties of T1 and configurations of 
properties of T2. For instance, molecular biology can identify DNA sequences as those 
configurations that lead to the characteristic effects of genes (as defined by classical genetics) 
even though gene tokens of one single type may differ molecularly. Given that multiple 
realization does not hinder the discovery of realizer types (step 2), it is possible to provide, in 
terms of T2, reductive explanations (step 3) of why there are properties coming under T1 in the 
world. Thus, molecular biology explains why genes have their characteristic effects (defined 
by classical genetics, step 1) by outlining the mechanisms of how certain DNA sequences 
(step 2) lead to, for instance, the synthesis of proteins that bring about the phenotypic effects 
in question, given normal conditions in the organism and its environment. 
To put the matter more formally, one-way conditionals describing a property or 
configuration of properties of a certain type in the domain of T2 as a realizer of a property 
type in the domain of T1 are sufficient for reductive explanations. Let F be a concept proper to 
T1, seizing properties of a certain type in the domain of T1, and let P1 be a concept proper to 
T2, seizing properties of a certain type in the domain of T2, being a realizer of F. In singling 
out a token x coming under P1 as a realizer of F, thus coming also under the concept F in T1, 
one takes for granted a bridge principle of the following form: 
 
(2) ∀x (P1x →  Fx) 
 
Strong supervenience assures us that this connection is at least nomologically necessary, if 
not metaphysically necessary: if the concept P1 in T2 describes a supervenience base for 
tokens that are described in terms of the concept F in T1 and thus expresses a sufficient 
condition for there being tokens that can be described in terms of F in T1, then whenever there 
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is a configuration of the type P1 in the domain of T2, there is a token of F in the domain of T1. 
However, the reverse conditional does not hold: 
 
(3) ∀x (Fx →  P1x) is false. 
 
Due to multiple realization, there may be configurations of the type P2 in the domain of T2 
that also realize F. Consequently, the following one-way conditional holds also with 
nomological necessity: 
 
(4) ∀x (P2x →  Fx) 
 
Hence, bridge principles in the form of such one-way conditionals are sufficient for 
assuring that for each property token coming under F in T1, there is the possibility of a 
reductive explanation of that token in terms of concepts that are proper to T2 (P1 or P2, etc.). 
The possibility of such a reductive explanation is secured by the functional character of this 
model of reduction: assuming the strong supervenience of higher-level properties on lower-
level properties, the lower-level descriptions P1 and P2 grasp the causal properties that in turn 
explain how the causal role defining F is brought about in each case. 
Though one-way conditionals are sufficient for the discovery of realizer types and 
reductive explanations, one-way conditionals are not sufficient for reducing T1 to T2, even if 
the domain of objects of T1 is a proper part of the domain of objects of T2 (T2 may be a 
fundamental and universal physical theory). The reason is that one cannot deduce the laws of 
T1 from the laws of T2: there are no concepts available in T2 that are coextensive with the 
concepts proper to T1 and in which the laws of T2 can be formulated, insofar as they are 
pertinent for that part of the domain of objects of T2 that is identical with the domain of 
objects of T1. Consequently, one cannot deduce the laws of T1 from laws of T2: the concepts 
figuring in fundamental and universal laws of nature (such as e.g. the laws of gravity or 
electromagnetism) are too general in order to deduce the laws of T1 from these laws, and the 
concepts proper to T2 that seize particular realizer types of property types of T1 and laws or 
law-like generalizations formulated in terms of these concepts are too specific to capture the 
property types on which T1 focuses: if there is multiple realization, several concepts proper to 
T2 are needed to cover the extension of a single concept proper to T1. 
Nonetheless, Lewis and Kim propose a middle way between reductive explanations of 
individual tokens and a fully-fledged theory reduction. That middle way, known as local 
reduction, is based on considering groups in which a property type of T1 is not multiply 
realized. Let us consider an artificial example: assume for the sake of the argument that pain 
is a functional property type in which folk psychology (T1) trades. Suppose that if and only if 
a human being suffers pain, c-fibres in the human brain are stimulated. Suppose furthermore 
that if and only if an octopus suffers pain, b-fibres in the brain of the octopus are stimulated. 
In this case, as far as the human species is concerned, the functional concept “suffers pain” is 
coextensive with the neurobiological concept “c-fibres are stimulated”. Furthermore, as far as 
the species octopus is concerned, the functional concept “suffers pain” is coextensive with the 
neurobiological concept “b-fibres are stimulated”. Consequently, the psychological, 
functional theory about pain can be reduced to the neurobiological theory about c-fibres in the 
case of the human species, and it can be reduced to the neurobiological theory about b-fibres 
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in the case of the species octopus. We thus need one reducing theory for each realizer type of 
a given property type of T1 (see Lewis 1969, 1980 and Kim 1998, in particular pp. 93-95, and 
2005, in particular p. 25). 
The theory T1 thus is split into several theories T1a, T1b, T1c, etc, which are in turn reduced to 
several theories T2a, T2b, T2c, etc. corresponding to the various realizer types of the property 
types in which T1 trades. The crucial move in order to achieve such local reductions, limited 
to one specific group of realizers, is the replacement of each multiply realized property type 
or concept proper to T1 with several hybrid types or concepts that are relative to particular 
groups in which there is uniform realization – such as “pain-in-humans”, or “pain-in-
octopus”, etc. These latter concepts are then coextensive with the concepts of a reducing 
theory each – “pain-in-humans” is coextensive with “c-fibres are stimulated”, “pain-in-
octopus” is coextensive with “b-fibres are stimulated”, etc. However, these hybrid concepts 
are not concepts proper to T1: they cannot be construed in the vocabulary of T1 alone. 
The original concepts of T1 are functionally individuated. This means that all the property 
tokens coming under the concept F proper to T1 are causally identical from the point of view 
of T1. However, given multiple realization, these property tokens supervene on configurations 
of physical property tokens that are different from the point of view of T2 and that are 
consequently causally heterogeneous. If these configurations of physical property tokens were 
not causally heterogeneous, there would be no reason to assume that they belong to different 
physical types. The problem then is that the patterns of causal regularities that are grasped by 
T1 are invisible from the point of view of T2. Consequently, the possibility to account, within 
T2, for the ability of T1 to grasp salient patterns of regularities gets lost. 
The introduction of hybrid group-specific concepts such as “F in group S1”, “F in group 
S2”, etc., cannot alleviate this consequence. These concepts cannot help to make the ability of 
T1 to grasp causal regularities that are invisible from the perspective of T2 intelligible. 
Introducing hybrid group-specific concepts or types simply shifts the problem raised by 
multiple realization from the relationship between the types of T1 and the types of T2 to the one 
obtaining between the types of T1 and these new hybrid types or concepts. By way of 
consequence, the homogeneous pattern or natural kind that T1 seizes by forming a concept F 
gets lost in this proposal. The uniform type in which T1 trades by building a concept F is split 
into group-specific types, whereby the conjunction of these groups does not have anything in 
particular in common from the physical point of view that defines these groups. It is therefore 
not possible to retrieve on the basis of concepts such as “F in group S1”, “F in group S2”, etc. 
a significant common content “F”, seizing a homogeneous pattern or natural kind in the 
world. “F” means something different in S1, S2, etc. This account thereby fails to achieve a 
key goal of inter-theoretic reduction, namely to explain how higher-level theories are able to 
provide homogeneous causal explanations of phenomena that are heterogeneous from the 
physical point of view. One therefore ends up in eliminating the functional types F of T1, as 
Kim himself concedes: 
Unless two realizers of E show significant causal/nomological diversity, there is no clear reason 
why we should count them as two, not one. It follows then that multiply realizable properties are 
ipso facto causally and nomologically heterogeneous. This is especially obvious when one 
reflects on the causal inheritance principle. All this points to the inescapable conclusion that E, 
because of its causal/nomic heterogeneity, is unfit to figure in laws, and is thereby disqualified 
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as a useful scientific property. … The conclusion, therefore, has to be this: as a significant 
scientific property, E has been reduced – eliminatively. (Kim 1999, pp. 17-18) 
E stands here for any functional property type of a special science that is not identical with a 
physical property type. This conclusion, however, is devastating for the project of group-
specific reductions: instead of improving on reductive explanations of individual tokens, 
going half the way towards a theory reduction, the basis for such reductive explanations is in 
fact undermined, if the concepts or property types F on which T1 focuses itself are de facto 
eliminated. In a later paper, Kim urges us to abandon the property types F in which T1 trades 
as genuine, unitary types (natural kinds); he nevertheless proposes to retain the concepts 
proper to T1, but only as conventions to which no natural kinds, patterns or pertinent 
similarities in nature correspond (Kim 2008, pp. 108-112). Thus again, we have to eliminate 
the concepts proper to T1 as classifications that possess a scientific quality. 
In this manner, the proposal of a group-specific theory reduction of Lewis and Kim 
collapses in fact into the conception known as new wave reductionism (Bickle 1998, 2003) 
that goes back to Hooker (1981, in particular p. 49). According to this latter conception, one 
constructs within the vocabulary of an encompassing physical theory T2 a specific reducing 
theory T2a, T2b,T2c, etc. for each realizer group of the functional property types F in which a 
theory T1 of a special science trades. These group specific theories formulated in terms of the 
concepts proper to T2 then replace T1. 
Let us sum up. Given the fact that we have universal and fundamental physical theories at 
our disposal, eliminating the scientific quality of the theories of the special sciences and 
retaining the kinds in which these theories trade only for heuristic and practical purposes is an 
answer to the question of the unity of science that is easily available, but unsatisfactory. Many 
of the theories of the special sciences are mature theories by all standards, having ample 
predictive success. If one regards the no miracles argument as a good argument for scientific 
realism, one has to take into account the fact that this argument applies not only to 
fundamental physics up to molecular chemistry, but also to many theories of the special 
sciences. In what follows, we therefore set out to improve on the functional model of 
reduction in order to show how it is possible to vindicate the scientific quality of the special 
sciences. As we shall demonstrate, the special sciences grasp objective patterns of similarities, 
which cannot be grasped by fundamental theories, and they have consequently a legitimate 
status in our body of scientific knowledge rather than simply a heuristic role. The outcome of 
our development will be a proposal for a conservative strategy of functional reduction that 
does not suffer from the eliminativist consequences of Kim’s model or new wave 
reductionism. 
3. The need for biconditionals and how to obtain them 
If there is multiple realization, then it is not possible to build types or concepts within a 
reducing theory T2 that are coextensive with the types or concepts in which T1 trades and that 
seize, if T1 is a mature theory with ample predictive success, natural kinds or at least objective 
patterns of similarities that exist in the world. Nonetheless, there are reductive explanations of 
any token of a property type of T1 in terms of T2 possible, based on one-way conditionals from 
concepts proper to T2 to concepts proper to T1. However, such reductive explanations cannot 
stand on their own, for they leave the homogeneous patterns that T1 highlights unconnected to 
the types and concepts in which T2 trades. Lewis’ and Kim’s conception of a local, group-
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specific reduction does not improve on this situation, leading on the contrary to an elimination 
of the types and concepts proper to T1 from mature science. The conclusion hence is that we 
have to relate the types or concepts that are proper to T1 to the types or concepts proper to T2, 
and we need biconditionals (coextensive types or concepts) to do so. Lewis’ and Kim’s 
conception is therefore on the right track insofar as it seeks to obtain on the basis of the types 
or concepts in which T1 trades more specific types or concepts that are coextensive with types 
or concepts proper to T2. The problem is that Lewis and Kim do so by using criteria from T2 
that are foreign to T1 so that the unity of the types or concepts of T1 gets lost by being 
relativized to certain groups that are defined in terms of T2. By contrast, we shall show in this 
section how one can obtain more fine-grained functional sub-types of the types in which T1 
trades that are coextensive with types that can be built in T2, but that are construed by relying 
only on the conceptual means of T1. 
If there are different types of realizers P1, P2, P3, etc., described by T2, of a property type F 
of T1, then these realizer types differ not only in their molecular composition, but also in their 
causal dispositions. If the differences in composition did not imply causal differences, we 
would not be in the position to establish that the realizers of F come under different physical 
types. In order to be in the position to detect differences between them, these differences have 
to imply the disposition to react differently in interactions with measuring instruments. The 
claim that differences in composition imply causal differences holds not only if one 
subscribes to a version of what is known as the causal theory of properties according to which 
the causal role is essential to a property so that in all the possible worlds in which there are 
properties of the type P, these properties play the same role in each world (see e.g. Shoemaker 
1980); this claim also holds in a Humean theory of categorical properties, being pure qualities 
whose essence is a quiddity and that exercise different causal roles in different possible 
worlds depending on the whole distribution of the fundamental properties in a given world: as 
far as the relationship between the functional property types in which the special sciences 
trade and the types of physical realizer properties is concerned, whenever there are different 
physical realizer types of a given property type F of a special science in the world, there are, 
against the background of the whole distribution of the physical properties in the actual world, 
differences in the causal relations in which tokens of these physical property types stand – 
such as differences in the interaction with measuring instruments. It is only that these physical 
property types are themselves multiply realized by pure qualities of different types, and we 
cannot detect these latter differences (that consequence is known as humility; see e.g. Lewis 
2009). 
Independently of the metaphysics of properties to which one subscribes, one thus has to 
acknowledge that differences in composition, accounting for there being realizers of different 
physical types of a given property type F of a special science in the actual world, imply causal 
differences. Note that not any odd difference in composition between two tokens of a realizer 
of F amounts to there being two different types of realizers of F and thus a case of multiple 
realization. To get multiple realization in a non-trivial sense, the differences in composition 
have to concern the way in which F, being defined in a causal manner by certain 
characteristic effects, is realized. In other words, differences in composition between two or 
more realizer tokens of F amount to there being two or more realizer types of F if and only if 
these differences concern the components of the mechanism by means of which each realizer 
brings about the effects that characterize F. Against the background of the fact that 
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differences in composition imply causal differences on any theory of properties, one thus 
filters out the causal differences that account for there being two or more realizers types of F 
by demanding that the causal differences concern the way by means of which the effects that 
characterize F are brought about. 
Such causal differences are not limited to the way or mechanism that brings about the 
effects that characterize F, leading always to identical effects such that these differences 
cannot be detected by employing the conceptual means of the theory in which F is embedded, 
that is, T1. As already mentioned, whenever there are differences in composition, these 
differences can be detected only if they imply causal differences in the reaction with 
measuring instruments. A fortiori, differences in composition that imply different mechanisms 
or ways to bring about the effects that characterize F and that thereby amount to there being 
different types of realizers of F lead to differences in the interaction with measurement 
devices. Such differences are macroscopic differences that can be observed with the naked 
eye and can thus be expressed by the conceptual means of common sense. Against that 
background, one can easily conceive experimental conditions such that differences in the way 
in which the effects that characterize F are brought about lead to causal differences that can 
be detected and expressed within the framework of T1, although that conceptual framework 
may not be sufficient to explain why such differences occur. 
There is nothing particular about measuring instruments and measuring interactions. These 
are by no means natural kinds – such as gravitational or electromagnetic interaction, and 
accordingly mass and charge. There is no physical definition of what constitutes a measuring 
interaction and a measurement device. In the present context and for the purposes of this 
paper, we can therefore simply talk in terms of the more general notion of environmental 
context. In certain environmental contexts – which can be artificially created in a laboratory, 
but which can also obtain in nature without human intervention –, the differences in the ways 
in which the effects that characterize F are brought about, accounting for there being two 
types of realizers of F, lead to differences in these effects themselves that can be detected on 
the level of description of T1, although presumably not be explained on that level. 
The following reasoning adds further support to the claim that, even without human 
intervention, differences in realization entail differences that are salient at the level of 
description of T1. Consider a possible world w1 at t0 which is identical to the actual world in 
any respect and another possible world w2 at t0 which is also exactly alike the actual world 
from the point of view of T1 but in which there is no multiple realization: any property token 
of T1 is realized in w2 by the same type of configuration from the point of view of T2. It is clear 
that in such circumstances, w1 and w2 are not distinguishable from the point of view of T1 at t0. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that after a certain length of time, at t0+n, both worlds 
will nonetheless be distinguishable from the point of view of T1 as well. In w2, entities coming 
under a concept proper to T1 fulfil, due to their physical differences, slightly different causal 
roles. These differences lead over time to differences with respect to the causal evolution of 
w1 that are likely to be important enough to end up in differences that are observable using the 
descriptive resources of T1. 
This example assumes that at some point of time, a divergence within the respective 
distributions of property tokens described by T1 in w1 and w2 will occur. It means that at this 
point of time, an entity coming under a certain concept F in T1 and a physical concept P1 in w1 
and its counterpart in w2, coming also under F but under P2 instead of P1, will react to their 
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environment in a way that is sufficiently dissimilar to give rise to a difference between both 
worlds that can be grasped by using only the conceptual resources of T1. There are hence 
environmental circumstances in which differences in realization lead to functional differences 
as well. 
Let us illustrate these claims by drawing on classical genetics. Multiple realization in this 
field of research is an empirical fact that is not astonishing, since the approach of classical 
genetics is more abstract than the one of molecular genetics. Natural selection explains why 
there is multiple realization in the domain of classical genetics (see Papineau 1993, p. 47, and 
also Rosenberg 2001): depending on the environmental conditions, only some of the causal 
powers of a given molecular configuration, realizing a property of the type F of classical 
genetics, are pertinent for selection. Against this background, it is reasonable that the proper 
concepts of classical genetics abstract from molecular differences. There are for instance 
molecular differences among DNA sequences possible that, under certain cellular conditions, 
do not amount to phenotypic (functional) differences. 
These molecular differences, as already mentioned, are different ways to bring about the 
effects that define F. There then is at least one difference in the production of side effects that 
are systematically linked with the main effects in question – such as different causal 
interactions with the molecular environment within the cell during the causal process from a 
gene to the production of its characteristic phenotypic effects. For any such difference in side 
effects, there is a molecular environment possible in which that difference leads to a 
detectable functional difference within the scope of classical genetics and the evolutionary 
context because any such difference may become pertinent to selection in certain 
environments (see Rosenberg 1994, p. 32). Consequently, that difference can in principle also 
be considered in terms of the concepts that are proper to classical genetics. One can thus, for 
instance, introduce more precise functional definitions that take into account different reaction 
norms that are linked to the molecular differences. A reaction norm is a function defining the 
different probabilities of fitness contributions of a gene relative to different environments. 
Against this background, for any type F of T1 (that is multiply realized by P1, P2, etc.), it is 
possible to conceive functional sub-types F1, F2, etc., taking those side effects in terms of 
different reaction norms into account (see also Bechtel and Mundale 1999 as regards the 
possibility to introduce more fine-grained functional concepts of the special sciences). 
These sub-types are no longer multiply realizable, since any molecular difference that is 
relevant to distinguish between different types of realizers leads to specific functional 
differences – to a unique reaction norm, for instance. The functionally defined sub-types 
hence correspond to one type of molecular configuration each, bringing about the effects that 
define F in one particular way. These sub-types thus are nomologically coextensive with the 
physical or molecular types P1, P2, etc. By means of these sub-types we hence attain types or 
concepts of classical genetics that are nomologically coextensive with molecular types or 
concepts and thus make it possible to reduce classical genetics to a molecular theory in a 
functional manner. 
More precisely and more generally speaking, (1) within an encompassing fundamental 
physical or molecular theory T2, one builds the concepts P1, P2, etc. capturing the differences 
in composition among the physical configurations that are all described by the same concept 
F in T1. (2) One makes F more precise by building functional sub-concepts (sub-types) F1, 
F2, etc. of F, seizing the systematic side effects linked to the different ways of producing the 
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effects that define F. Provided that one such functionally defined sub-concept can be 
construed for each type of realizer of F in such a way that the former grasps the functional 
differences to which the latter give rise under certain circumstances, it follows that these sub-
concepts F1, F2, etc. are nomologically coextensive with the concepts P1, P2, etc. (3) One can 
reduce any concept F of T1 to T2 via F1, F2, etc. and P1, P2, etc. Starting from T2, one builds 
P1, P2, etc. and then deduces F1, F2, etc. from P1, P2, etc. given the nomological coextension. 
One gains then F by abstracting from the conceptualization of the functional side effects 
contained in F1, F2, etc, retaining only the main functional specification they have in 
common, which is nothing but the functional definition of F. This abstraction step depends on 
what the world is like rather than solely on our heuristic and practical aims. It enables thereby 
to highlight genuine causal similarities in the world that Kim’s model and the new wave 
reductionism cannot account for. As regards the laws, one can formulate the laws of T1 in 
terms of F1, F2, etc. by adding more functional details. Given the nomological coextension, 
one can deduce these sub-type laws from the laws of T2, couched in terms of P1, P2, etc. and 
then gain the laws of T1 formulated in terms of F by a theory-immanent abstraction from 
functional details (that are not relevant in many environmental contexts) (see Esfeld and 
Sachse 2011, chapters 4 and 5, for more details as regards the reduction of molecular biology 
and Soom, Sachse and Esfeld 2010 for an application of this strategy to folk psychology). 
This account of reduction by means of functionally defined sub-concepts has two decisive 
virtues. In the first place, due to the fact that this approach proceeds by functionalization of 
the higher level concepts and property types, it yields reductive explanations of why certain 
entities making true the application of the concepts P1, P2, etc. also make true the application 
of the concepts F1, F2, etc., and thereby the application of the concept F. Moreover, the 
physical concepts P1, P2, etc. explain how certain entities in the worlds fulfil the causal roles 
defining the concepts F1, F2, etc. as well as F. This is how this account incorporates the 
explanatory virtues of functional reduction. 
Secondly, the above-mentioned sub-concepts are not construed in a group-specific way 
based on physical criteria, but in terms of purely functional differences only. Taking the 
functional definition of F as a starting point, the functional sub-concepts F1 and F2 of F are 
distinct only by conceptualizing the different ways in which the effects that define F are 
produced. Consequently, F always has the same substantial “specification of the function” in 
F1, F2: these sub-concepts clearly express for biologists what their referents functionally have 
in common and what their functional differences are. Consequently, multiple realization turns 
out to be an intra-theoretic issue, since the relation between F1, F2 and F is a matter of 
variation of the degree of precision in the description of the causal role that characterizes F. 
Here, the variation of the degree of precision depends on what environmental conditions 
obtain. By contrast, in Lewis’ and Kim’s account, multiple realization remains an inter-
theoretic issue, with respect to which, as argued, the introduction of group-specific concepts 
does not provide any help due to their hybrid – both physical and functional – individuation. 
This is why the present proposal does not put the scientific quality of the concept F – its 
suitability to seize a natural kind – and the laws couched in terms of F in jeopardy, but 
vindicates that scientific quality by systematically linking F and the laws in terms of F with 
molecular biology, and finally physics. 
Let us point out an additional merit of this proposal that concerns the position occupied by 
the special sciences in a comprehensive system of scientific knowledge. On the basis of in the 
 Marrying the merits of Nagelian reduction and functional reduction  12
last resort the fundamental physical laws, one can formulate laws in terms of P1, P2, etc. that 
refer to the properties on which classical genetics focuses. From those laws, one can deduce 
genetical laws in terms of F1, F2, etc. given the nomological coextension of these concepts. 
One then reaches the laws and explanations in terms of F by neglecting the functional side 
effects originally taken into account by F1, F2, etc. in order to retrieve the concept F. Since 
the “specification of the function” of F is contained in each of its sub-concepts, there is no 
threat of elimination for the abstract concept F. The abstract laws of classical genetics 
couched in terms of F are non-molecular (non-physical) and not replaceable by molecular 
genetics in the sense that there is no single molecular law having the same extension as any of 
these laws. The molecular laws are too general and those molecular (physical) concepts that 
focus on the composition of the complex configurations in question (the concepts P1, P2, etc.) 
are too restricted. When talking about complex configurations such as e.g. genes, or whole 
organisms, the molecular concepts focus on their composition. Due to selection there are 
salient causal similarities among effects that such complex configurations produce as a whole 
although they differ in composition. The concepts seizing these similarities are therefore with 
good reason not considered as molecular concepts, but taken to be concepts of classical 
genetics. This is why, in addition to provide a conservative reduction by systematically 
linking F and the laws in terms of F with molecular biology, and finally physics, this account 
of functional reduction vindicates the scientific indispensability of classical genetics and the 
special sciences in general, since it is only by means of abstract functional concepts that we 
are able to bring out objective patterns of similarities that apply to relatively large sets of 
physically different entities under certain environmental circumstances. None of the current 
other accounts of inter-theoretic reduction can provide an equivalent outcome.  
In conclusion, the merit of Nagelian reduction is to point out the only way open for a theory 
reduction, namely a deduction of the laws of the reduced theory T1 from the laws of the 
reducing theory T2 by means of biconditionals. The need for biconditionals is implicitly also 
acknowledged in Lewis’ and Kim’s account, seeking for group-specific biconditionals. In this 
paper, we have improved on Lewis’ and Kim’s account by replacing the group-specific types 
with functional sub-types or sub-concepts that are construed by relying only on the conceptual 
means of T1 and that are coextensive with the realizer types described in the vocabulary of T2. 
Functional reduction provides, via the notion of physical realization, explanations of why 
there are in the world the properties on which the special sciences focus. However, multiple 
realization seems to rule out the reduction of the theories of the special sciences to physical 
theories. But the reductive, functional explanations of property tokens in the domain of a 
theory of the special sciences cannot stand on their own, as our discussion of Lewis’ and 
Kim’s account has made evident; for the scientific quality of the types in which the special 
sciences trade then gets lost. By contrast to what Kim (2008, pp. 108-112) claims, the 
concepts of the special sciences are not purely conventional, but seize salient similarities 
(natural kinds, homogeneous patterns) in nature, since selection abstracts in many 
environmental contexts from physical or molecular differences; but since there always are 
also environmental contexts possible in which these very physical or molecular differences 
are pertinent to selection, a conservative reduction of the types and concepts of the special 
sciences via purely functional sub-types or sub-concepts to physical or molecular types or 
concepts is possible. In thus showing how reductive, functional explanations can be expanded 
into a theory reduction via functional sub-types, we have married the merits of Nagelian 
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reduction and functional reduction – achieving functional, reductive explanations that are 
backed up by a theory reduction that vindicates the scientific quality of the theories of the 
special sciences. 
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